A Water Main Break, a Creek, and Other Work-From-Home Distractions

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn June 15, 2012In: Telecommuting

Email This Post | Print this Post

I'm working from home today but not by choice. Our office is quasi-closed today as a result a water main break just a few blocks away from our building in Wilmington, as shown in the video below by 6abc.

Of course, just because I can't go to the office to work doesn't mean I get to take the day off--the work still must be done. In the era of mobile computing and the paperless office, this does not present much of a technological challenge. I have ready access to everything I would have access to if I were sitting at my desk. Well, everything but my multiple-monitor computer set-up, I suppose.

But I digress. Which brings me back to my original point.

Working at home is hard. For me, anyway. I am too easily distracted. By the cat, who is as cute as can be and who just loves it when he's got a lap to sit in, pesky laptop be damned. By the bonsai tree that could use a meticulous pruning. By my car, which is calling to me at this very moment, asking that I give her a nice wash, followed by a leisurely drive with the top down.

Blue Heron


By the view from my deck of the Brandywine Creek, which is as beautiful and serene as one might imagine a lazy creek to be on a clear day in June. Or the Great Blue Heron who, and I am not making this up, is perched on a rock, looking for lunch, at this very moment.


Or the rose garden at the end of my street, which is in full bloom and beautiful beyond belief.


I live in a park, people! It's not my fault that I'm surrounded by all of these incredible distractions! Blame Mother Nature!


Josephine Rose Garden


But, again, I digress. The point that I am trying to get around to making is that, as a general rule, working from home really doesn't work for me. At my desk, I'm a disciplined, focused, work-generating fool of a task-master. But at home, I find that I mostly just walk in circles.


Maybe I'll read some news articles to help me find the working-from-home sweet spot. For example, the Top 10 Mistakes Everyone Makes When Working From Home on Forbes.com. Or How to Work From Home Without Losing Your Mind (or Your Job) by Ask a Manager's Alison Green at US News' On Careers blog. According to Attorney Marketing blog, 2% of lawyers work from home all of the time. And good for them--there are plenty of benefits of telecommuting for those who have the self-control to stay on task.

Or maybe I'll just get back to work. Wish me luck and have a great Friday, wherever you may be today!

Ethical Lawyer Blogging in Virginia

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn June 14, 2012In: Purely Legal

Email This Post | Print this Post

A three-judge panel in Virginia has issued its decision in an important case for lawyers who blog or who are thinking of starting a blog. The case involved the appeal of a ruling by Virginia State Bar Association's disciplinary committee about a blog written by Virginia lawyer Horace Hunter. The committee originally pursued a complaint against Mr. Hunter when he refused to include the exact disclaimer required by the Bar Association.

I was lucky enough to appear on an all-star panel of speakers, including Mr. Hunter, a few months ago, when we presented a CLE hosted by the ABA, titled, Is Your Legal Blog Compliant? To learn more about the specific facts leading to the complaint, I'd strongly recommend the episode of the Legal Talk Network podcast, Lawyer 2 Lawyer, on which Mr. Hunter was a guest.

There were two issues before the panel. First, whether Mr. Hunter had breached his duty of confidentiality pursuant to Rule 1.6 by writing about his clients' cases on his blog. The information contained in the blog posts was publicly available. The panel overturned the finding of misconduct by the State Bar's disciplinary committee.

Second, the panel was presented with the question of whether Mr. Hunter could be required by the State Bar to include a disclaimer on his blog. The panel upheld the committee's determination that a disclaimer was required in accordance with the attorney advertising rules set forth in Rules 7.1 and 7.2. Specifically, the disclaimer must state that results may vary from case to case, depending on the facts.

All lawyers--even those who do not blog--should look more closely at this decision and at the facts and arguments leading to this point. Mr. Hunter's arguments regarding the First Amendment implications of attorney advertising, particularly in the context of legal blogs.

See also, VA Lawyers' Weekly; Washington Post's Capital Business Blog; and Above The Law.

Guns In the Workplace: Implications of Open-Carry Laws

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn June 12, 2012In: Workplace Violence

Email This Post | Print this Post

Prof. Stephen Bainbridge makes a great argument against state laws that permit employees to store guns in their cars. In his post, Guns vs. At-Will Employment, Prof. Bainbridge discusses a recent decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court interpreting that state's gun laws. In its opinion, the Court found that an employee who was fired for having a handgun in his car (for which he had proper license), could bring a wrongful-termination suit against his employer, the University of Kentucky. Prof. Bainbridge concludes that these state laws constitute a significant and problematic exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.

On McAfee & Taft's EmployerLinc blog, Charlie Plumb recently wrote about a new law in Oklahoma that raises similar issues. "Concealed-carry laws" also took effect last year in Wisconsin and Texas.


Employers, Are Your Employees Minding Their Own Business?

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn June 11, 2012In: Jerks at Work

Email This Post | Print this Post

Employees send a lot of emails at work. Goodness knows, the emails in my inbox never seems to stop piling up. And I think we can all agree that emails we send at work aren't always work related. So what do we talk about when our emails are not strictly business?

A pair of Georgia Tech researchers have published their take on the answer--but you may not want to know what they found. According to Tanu Mitra and Eric Gilbert, in their paper, "Have You Heard? How Gossip Flows Through Workplace Email" (PDF), found that more than 1 in every 7 emails sent at work contains workplace gossip.

The study evaluated more than 500,000 emails sent by Enron employees and looked for The authors define email "gossip" as an email in which an employee is mentioned in the body of the text but not included as a recipient. The study has lots of juicy findings:

1. Who Engages In Email Gossip?
Workplace gossip is common at all levels of the organizational hierarchy. [No big shock here.] Employees are most likely to gossip with their peers and employees at the bottom of the corporate hierarchy are responsible for a large portion of email gossip.

2. What Types of Emails Include Gossip?
The study concludes that gossip appeared as often in personal exchanges as it did in formal business communications. Emails that are targeted to a smaller audience are more likely to contain gossip.

3. How Gossip-y is the Gossip?
Negative gossip appeared in emails 2.7 times more often than positive gossip. At the risk of stating the obvious, this is not a good finding for employers. If true, it would mean that, not only are employees wasting lots of time with gossiping emails but that they're probably doing some real harm to workplace morale. Employers, how much are you spending to pay employees to stir the pot? Nobody likes a pot stirrer.

4. And, a random but fascinating finding:
Mid-level in-house lawyers contribute the second-highest amount of downward-flowing gossip. Yikes! I won't even attempt to rationalize this finding. I'd say that I will take a harder look at my own practices but I never send non-work-related emails during working time. [Particularly when my boss may be reading this post!]

It's a fascinating subject matter and an equally fascinating paper.
[H/T Workplace Diva]

Privacy 3.0: Delaware Bench and Bar Recap

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn June 8, 2012In: Locally Speaking, Privacy In the Workplace, Seminars, Past

Email This Post | Print this Post

I had the honor of serving as moderator for the CLE program at Delaware's Annual Bench and Bar conference,the largest annual gathering of lawyers and judges. The program was titled, Privacy 3.0: Legal and Ethical Implications in the Courtroom, in the Workplace, and in Public. I was amazed at the quality of the presentations and speakers.

Privacy In the Courtroom: Jurors
The first session, Privacy in the Courtroom, was presented by two super-stars. First up was Thaddeus Hoffmeister, whose blog, Juries, is, hands down, the go-to source for the latest news relating to the impact of new technology on jurors. Thaddeus led a fascinating discussion about the privacy rights of jurors. Some of the questions that he raised were:

Do lawyers have a duty to conduct online research about potential jurors? Do lawyers have a duty to monitor jurors' online activity once empaneled? What constitutes "contact" in this context? For example, if you follow a juror on Twitter and he gets an email notification of it, this would be considered "contact" and you'd be running afoul of the ethics rules. And, finally, when must a lawyer disclose to the other side and to the court information that the lawyer finds that indicates juror online misconduct?

Thaddeus' presentation was amazingly current. Several attendees noted that he discussed several cases and opinions that were issued in the past two weeks! To learn more about these cutting-edge topics, check out his top-notch blog.

Privacy In the Courtroom: Journalists
Next up was Sean O'Sullivan. Sean has been reporting on Delaware's federal and state courts for more than a decade. Although Thaddeus was a tough act to follow, Sean absolutely rose to the challenge. In fact, Sean really impressed me--not only is he an all-star reporter but, apparently, an equally outstanding public speaker! Sean spoke about the current rules (written and unwritten) for reporters. He addressed the following issues:

Should there be live blogging and tweeting from the courtroom? If yes, should it be considered a privilege limited to journalists? And, if so, who is a "journalist" in today's world of new media?

Sean told attendees about an interesting development in the Sandusky trial. As reported in the major news networks late last week, the judge in the case announced that he would permit tweeting from the courtroom but with the caveat that the tweets could not include actual quotations.

Journalists moved the court to clarify what that meant--surely the court did not mean that only inaccurate quotations? Did the court mean that journalists had to paraphrase any tweets? In response to the motion, the court changed its mind and ordered that it would not permit live tweeting from the courtroom after all.

Further proving how current the speakers were, Thaddeus has written about the juror-investigation issue in the Sandusky trial.

Privacy In the Workplace
I was lucky enough to co-present this session with Steve Hirschfeld. Steve is the CEO of the Employer's Law Alliance, the world's largest network of employment and labor lawyers. Steve is an incredible speaker but it was his international experience is what really made the session outstanding.

Steve and I talked about the challenges facing employers that have led them to consider the use of social media, particularly in the hiring process. Then we reviewed some of the several ways employers are using social media as cyber-screening tools and gave our (somewhat diverging) thoughts on the pros and cons of those tools. In that context, we reviewed the legal implications of those tools. And, finally, we discussed the recent movement in several states to legislate these strategies, including, as you may have guessed, my thoughts on the unfortunately worded Delaware effort in this regard, H.B. 308.

Privacy In Public
The speakers for this session were the A-listers of the program. Sharon D. Nelson and John Simek of Sensei Enterprises presented a captivating story about how law enforcement used digital forensics to catch the Craigslist killer. Both Sharon and John are real pros behind the podium and everyone was so riveted by their storytelling that we hardly noticed how much substantive knowledge they had imparted.

Undoubtedly, my biggest take-away from their presentation was that there is no privacy in public--particularly when the government wants to know what you're doing, where you're doing it, and when you're doing it. For additional doses of disturbing reality regarding the lack of privacy, check out Sharon's award-winning blog, Ride the Lightning.

A Round of Applause
I can't thank the speakers enough for their participation in yesterday's event. It was a tremendous success as a result of the quality of all of the speakers who were so generous to donate their time and travel to Delaware for the event. Thanks, also, to all of the attendees for their insightful questions and discussion after the CLE.

Return-to-Work and Fitness-for-Duty Examinations Following an Employee's Medical Leave

Posted by Adria B. MartinelliOn June 7, 2012In: Family Medical Leave

Email This Post | Print this Post

Yesterday, I presented a section of the FMLA Master Class. In my session, we discussed mandatory return-to-work exams done by the employer's selected doctors. There were lots of questions on this issue as many employers continue to require return-to-work exams as a matter of course before employee can return to work after FMLA leave. In many instances, such a practice will be in violation of the ADA and the FMLA. I promised a more thorough discussion of the issue, so here it is.

FMLA Regulations on Return-To-Work and Fitness-for-Duty Exams

The FMLA regulations state the following:

  • As a condition of restoring an employee whose FMLA leave was occasioned by the employee's own serious health condition that made the employee unable to perform the employee's job, an employer may have a uniformly-applied policy or practice that requires all similarly-situated employees (i.e., same occupation, same serious health condition), who take leave for such conditions to obtain and present certification from the employee's health care provider that the employee is able to resume work. The employee has the same obligations to participate and cooperate (including providing a complete and sufficient certification or providing sufficient authorization to the health care provider to provide the information directly to the employer) in the fitness-for-duty certification process as in the initial certification process. See §825.305(d).
  • An employer may seek a fitness-for-duty certification only with regard to the particular health condition that caused the employee's need for FMLA leave. The certification from the employee's health care provider must certify that the employee is able to resume work. Additionally, an employer may require that the certification specifically address the employee's ability to perform the essential functions of the employee's job. In order to require such a certification, an employer must provide an employee with a list of the essential functions of the employee's job no later than with the designation notice required by §825.300(d), and must indicate in the designation notice that the certification must address the employee's ability to perform those essential functions. If the employer satisfies these requirements, the employee's health care provider must certify that the employee can perform the identified essential functions of his or her job. Following the procedures set forth in §825.307(a), the employer may contact the employee's health care provider for purposes of clarifying and authenticating the fitness-for-duty certification. Clarification may be requested only for the serious health condition for which FMLA leave was taken. The employer may not delay the employee's return to work while contact with the health care provider is being made. No second or third opinions on a fitness-for-duty certification may be required. 29 CFR § 825.312

These regulations make clear that the normal fitness-for-duty certification as prerequisite to return to work after FMLA leave is to be completed by the employee's own health care provider, not the employer's doctors. And a second opinion may not be requested. The requirements that it is uniformly applied and employee receives notice, relate to a fitness-for-duty certificate coming from the employee's HCP, not a return-to-work exam conducted by the employer.

Therefore, what is an employer to do when it has a genuine concern about an employee's ability to effectively perform the functions of his or her position, notwithstanding a cursory note from the employer's doctor stating otherwise? Under the FMLA, it appears the employer is out of luck.

ADA Comes to the Rescue - Sometimes
Here's where ADA may come to the rescue. The FMLA regs state that ADA requirements apply, and under the ADA employers have the right to conduct medical examinations to determine whether an employee can perform the essential functions of his or her job (with or without reasonable accommodation) in certain situations. Therefore, after an employee returns from FMLA leave, a medical examination at an employer's expense by the employer's health care provider may be required if it is job-related and consistent with business necessity. A number of cases have explored what qualifies as "job related and consistent with business necessity." The key criteria are as follows:

There is a reasonable basis for the exams.
The employer must have a "reason to doubt the employee's ability to perform the essential functions of the job." For instance, a discrepancy between the doctor's original letter and return-to-work certificate would be a reasonable basis. But, short of information from the employee's own provider which leaves doubt, what will at court consider a "valid reason to doubt the employee's ability to perform the job?" Certainly, direct observation of the employee's physical restrictions, on or off the job, would be sufficient. Many employers, however, seem to feel it is their right to have their own HCP conduct an exam, when there is little or no objective basis for doubt of what the employee's HCP is telling them. It appears that courts in very limited circumstances have found such exams as "job related and consistent with business necessity - when the reason for leave directly related to and impacted the employee's ability to safely perform the job. For example, a police officer who breaks his arm. His ability to carry and discharge a gun is so critical to his safe performance if his job duties, that if his employer required a RTW exam narrowly tailored to the use of his arm, this would probably be upheld even if there was not a reasonable basis to doubt the officer's HCP opinion that his arm was fully functioning.

The exams are narrowly focused.
The medical exam should seek only information about the effect of the particular injury or illness that necessitated the leave on the employee's ability to return to work. Don't request a general physical or a return-to-work certificate stipulating the employee is in "good health." This again, is where many employers get into trouble. Many employers require the employees to provide medication information far beyond the original condition generating the leave. The more narrowly focused the RTW exam is, the less likely a court will delve into whether or not there was a reasonable basis for the exam in the first place.

The medical examination requirements are applied consistently.
Of course, as with all employment best practices, similarly situated workers must be treated the same.

Bottom Line
If your organization requires return-to-work physicals by its own health care provider as a matter of course for employees returning from FMLA leave, you need to take a close look at this practice. If you don't have a reasonable basis to believe the employee is unable to perform their duties safely, then you should not be requiring these exams. If you maintain this practice despite my advice otherwise, you should ensure that they are narrowly tailored to the injury or illness that necessitated the leave. Failure to narrowly focus the exams or to have a reasonable basis to conduct them in the first place will leave your organization exposed under both FMLA and ADA.

June 6: FMLA Master Class

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn June 5, 2012In: Seminars

Email This Post | Print this Post

The Family and Medical Leave Act has been a part of the workplace for more than a decade, so it's gotten easier for HR to administer, right? Not so. Confusing regulations, coupled with numerous recent changes at both the legislative and regulatory levels and conflicting court decisions, ensure that FMLA continues to be one of the biggest compliance headaches for employers.

The FMLA Master Class can help you clarify the confusion surrounding the numerous legislative and regulatory changes to the Family and Medical Leave Act and get answers to all your FMLA questions at this advanced-level seminar just for Delaware employers.

Details:
Wednesday, June 6, 2012
Holiday Inn Select -- Wilmington
630 Naamans Road
Claymont, DE 19703
302.792.2700

Seminar Fee:
Just $397 per person
Just $297 for each additional person from your organization

Visit HRhero.com to see the full agenda and to register.

Privacy Claim for Employer's Shoulder Surfing of Employee's Facebook Page

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn June 4, 2012In: Social Media in the Workplace

Email This Post | Print this Post

When can an employer ask an employee to show the employer a coworker's Facebook page? My friends, that question is getting more difficult to answer. State legislators across the country are attempting to pass laws that would prohibit this and similar conduct under most circumstances. Delaware's proposed "Workplace Privacy" law would prohibit it in every instance--even if the employer has a legitimate business-related need to investigate misconduct, for example. A recent decision from the District of New Jersey makes one thing clear: nothing is clear when we're talking about privacy interests and Facebook.

The Facts

The plaintiff, Deborah Ehling, was hired by the hospital in 2004 as a registered nurse and paramedic. In July 2008, Ehling took over as Acting President of the local union for paramedics. In this role, she was "very proactive" in her efforts on behalf of union members and filed numerous complaints and charges against the hospital. Ehling alleged that, when she became President of the Union, the hospital engaged in retaliatory conduct against her, ending in her termination in July 2011.

Ehling was Facebook friends with many of her coworkers but not with any members of hospital management. Her profile was private and could be viewed only by her friends.

Ehling alleged that the hospital gained access to her Facebook profile when a supervisors "coerced, strong-armed, and/or threatened" one of Ehling's coworkers into accessing his Facebook account in the presence of a supervisor. The supervisor then viewed and copied Plaintiff's Facebook posts. The hospital later sent a copy of one of Ehling's Facebook posts to the State Department of Health, stating that it was concerned that it showed a disregard for patient safety. Plaintiff alleged that the letter was a "malicious' attempt to attack Plaintiff's reputation, her job, and her nursing license and paramedic certification.

The Claims

The hospital moved to dismiss 2 of the 9 counts in Ehling's Amended Complaint: (a) a state-law statutory claim under the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act; and (2) a state-law tort claim for invasion of privacy.

The court dismissed the Wiretapping count because the supervisor did not access the Facebook posts "in the course of transmission," which is a required element. The court concluded that, like the federal Wiretapping statute, the New Jersey Act does not apply to electronic communications once they are received. The court held that the Amended Complaint alleged that the posting was "live on the Facebook website for all of Plaintiff's Facebook friends to access and view." Thus, the post was no longer in transmission when the defendant allegedly accessed it.

The court did not dismiss the privacy claim. The hospital moved to dismiss this count on the ground that Plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her Facebook post. The court rule that "[p]rivacy in social networking is an emerging, but underdeveloped, area of case law." The court noted that there are cases on both ends of the "privacy spectrum"--some courts have found that there is absolutely no expectation of privacy once information has been posted online; whereas other courts have found a reasonable expectation of privacy exists for individual, password-protected online communications.

Because the law "has not yet developed a coherent approach to communications falling between these two extremes," the court declined to dismiss the claim, finding that Plaintiff had stated a plausible claim for invasion of privacy "especially given the open-ended nature of the case law." In other words, the Court punted on the question of whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her Facebook posts.

The Take-Away for Employers

On Eric Godman's Technology & Marketing Law Blog, Venkat Balasubramani, who alerted to me to this case via Twitter message (Thanks again, Venkat!) wrote an insightful post about several of the legal issues in the case. He also uses a term I heard only recently--"shoulder surfing"--which refers to a person who stands behind an internet user and watches the user's browsing activity. What I take away from the case is more back-to-basics than Venkat's more sophisticated approach.

In short, assuming everything alleged in the Amended Complaint are true, the key employer take-away is this:

Don't look for trouble or you just may find it.

If the supervisor did not have a reason to look at the employee's Facebook page--i.e., to go snooping around without reasonable suspicion of some conduct that would have harmed the hospital or prevented Ehling form performing her job duties is a bad idea. It makes you seem like you're prosecuting the employee, being malicious, and/or, as was alleged here, engaging in retaliation.

Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., No. 2:11-cv-03305-WJM (D.N.J. May 30, 2012).

Don't Hate Me Because I'm Beautiful

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn June 4, 2012In: Discrimination, Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Gender (Title VII), Hiring

Email This Post | Print this Post

Sex, drugs, and rock 'n roll. Employment law can involve any or all three. Which explains why it takes a certain personality to really love this gig. Lately, though, I've seen a bevy of employment-law stories involving claims based on or involving beautiful people.

Last week, for example, I reported on yet another story involving a woman who claims she was fired from her data-entry job in a lingerie warehouse for being too sexy. [Ed. Note: This story, which involves a woman alleging she was too sexy for her job in a lingerie warehouse owned by Orthodox Jews, should clear up any doubt about why I love my job.] This wasn't the first story of this kind, though. I've reported about at least two similar claims in the past couple of years. And I recently reported about a gender-discrimination claim based on the plaintiff's part-time job as a dancer.

Michael Schmidt of the Social Media Employment Law Blog reports a different type of case involving exotic dancers. [Ed. Note: Michael's post is overflowing with hilarity in the form of well-crafted double entendres. For a great read, be sure to jump over to his original post, Slowly Stripping Away Privacy Rights. Brava, Michael!] In In re Penthouse Executive Club Compensation Litigation, No. 10-cv-1145 (KMV) (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2012), the employer-defendant sought to compel one of the plaintiffs, an "entertainer in the Penthouse Executive Club," to produce nine pages of Facebook messages that she'd exchanged with other plaintiffs and with non-parties about others joining the FLSA suit.

The judge considered the motion in the same way any similar motion would be considered. She found that the Facebook messages sent to non-parties were "prepared in anticipation of litigation" and, as such, were protected by the work-product doctrine because they were "descriptions of conversations with Plaintiffs' counsel regarding litigation strategy, as well as responses to questions about the lawsuit." On the other hand, Facebook messages sent by non-parties to the plaintiff were not subject to the same protections and had to be produced.

And here's a twist on the theme. Instead of claims brought by beautiful people, here's a story brought against beautiful people. The owner of Marylou's, a coffee shop in Rhode Island known for employing beautiful baristas donned in pink shirt, is speaking out against the EEOC. The coffee shop has been under investigation for more than a year by the federal agency, which claims to be investigating the business' hiring practices. There has not been a complaint of discrimination, though, and many members of the community are outraged at the expenditure of federal funds and the cost imposed on the business in the absence of any actual charge of wrongdoing.

Maybe the EEOC is just trying to balance out all of those don't-hate-me-because-I'm-beautiful claims.

Update: Social-Media Password Legislation

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn June 1, 2012In: Social Media in the Workplace

Email This Post | Print this Post

Several states have bills pending that would prohibit employers from requesting or requiring an employee's or applicant's social-media password. Maryland was the first state to pass such a "password-privacy" law.

Delaware's bill goes to the House of Representatives tomorrow. Readers know how troubled I am by how broad the legislation is--including it's prohibition on a supervisor sending a Facebook friend request or a LinkedIn request to connect to any other employee in the same company, and its prohibition against an employer's ability to investigate potential wrongdoing by an employee.

Last week, the Illinois Senate approved its own version. Several Illinois employment lawyers seem to have concerns about their State's new law similar to the concerns I have about Delaware's. For example, Jeff Nowak, who writes the blog, FMLA Insights, expressed his concerns about the potential implications of the Illinois law. And the title of a post by Philip Gordon, on Littler's Workplace Privacy Counsel blog, captures it perfectly:

Illinois' New Social Media Password Law Raises Substantial and Unjustified Obstacles to Employers' Legitimate Business Activities.

Ohio is the latest state to hop on the bandwagon, reports Jon Hyman on the Ohio Employer's Law Blog. Not surprisingly, Jon has identified some problems with the proposed law, many of which are similar to those I've identified with the Delaware law. Porter Wright's Brian Hall expressed similar concerns about the Ohio legislation.on his firm's blog, Employer Law Report.

And we all agree that these laws are just not necessary--employers are not engaging in this practice. But legislators just cannot seem to help themselves. The question is, will this political brouhaha end in a nightmare for employers?

Delaware's EEOC Charges of Discrimination for FY 2011

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn May 31, 2012In: Delaware Specific, Discrimination, Discrimination & Harassment

Email This Post | Print this Post

The EEOC recently released new data, which identifies the number of charges filed by state. It's no surprise that the number of charges has increased steadily over the past three years, up from 163 charges filed in FY 2009, to 175 in FY 2010, to 228 last year.
But the percent of charges filed in Delaware as compared to the rest of the U.S. has remained consistent for the past 3 years--making 0.2% of the total charges filed in the U.S.

To put it in perspective, Delaware has one of the smallest populations in the country--we rank 45th out of 50. With less than 1 million residents, Delaware makes up less than 0.3% of the nation's population.

Although these numbers do sound positive, employers should remember that the EEOC isn't the only game in town. Because Delaware has a work-share agreement with the EEOC, the Delaware Department of Labor also receives charges of discrimination. In FY 2009, for example, the DDOL took 728 charges. The EEOC, on the other hand, received only 163 charges that year. In short, Delaware employers should look at these numbers with cautious optimism.

See also, What the Delaware Charge Statistics Mean for Employers
and DDOL Charge Statistics for FY 2009

The NLRB Is Laughing All the Way to the Bank

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn May 30, 2012In: Social Media in the Workplace, Union and Labor Issues

Email This Post | Print this Post

NLRB's Acting G.C. Lafe Solomon issued his third report on social media today. (PDF).

And what a fervor it caused! What a frenzy! Twitter was all atwitter with excitement over the promise of some meaningful guidance on the interplay between the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and employers' social-media policies. I think it's safe to say that the tone around the blogosphere will slowed significantly by morning.

Why? Well, primarily because we've actually read the report. And, folks, the news is not good. In short G.C. Solomon has made one thing clear--if you are an employer, there is just about no way you can draft a policy that addresses employees' off-duty use of social media that you can feel confident will not potentially run afoul of the NLRA. Or at least of Mr. Solomon's interpretation of the NLRA.

My natural optimism prevents me from reviewing in detail the multitude of provisions that Mr. Solomon found to violate the NLRA. My fellow e-law bloggers, no doubt, will pick up my slack here. I'll give you just one so you have a little taste. Here's the first provision addressed in the memo that, according to Mr. Solomon, violates the NLRA :

[If you mention your employer or your employment in an online post,] don't release confidential guest, team member orcompany information.

Yes. You heard me right. That provision was found to be overly broad in violation of the NLRA. Oh, brother. Boy, oh boy! The NLRB is just killing it, right?!? It publishes three "reports," none of which are binding, none of which constitute precedent of any sort, and none of which have been reconciled by the smartest minds around. It could be said, in other words, that the three reports are worth a whole lot of nothing.

Yet, these three little reports arguably have caused more uproar than the last three employment-law decisions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court. They have effectively prevented numerous employers from implementing a social-media policy. They have, if nothing else, gotten our attention.

I, for one, am ready to move on. Unless and until the General Counsel publishes a report that a lawyer of average intelligence can translate into something useful, I am no longer interested. And what's the consequence of this brazen disregard? Not much. As I've posted previously, the risk of having a policy that is later found to be in violation of the NLRA is that you would have to change your policy and put up a posting about the change.

In the meantime, I'll continue to draft policies that come from the right place (i.e., education and prevention as primary goals), are only as restrictive as they need to be (i.e., no vague or overly broad language), and tie in other applicable workplace policies (e.g., anti-harassment, workplace violence, and reference requests). I'm willing to bet that I'll be in a small group and, if that's the case, the NLRB will be laughing the whole way to the bank.

New NLRB Memo on Social-Media Policies

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn May 30, 2012In: Social Media in the Workplace, Union and Labor Issues

Email This Post | Print this Post

Acting General Counsel to the NLRB, Lafe Solomon, issued today his third report on social media (pdf). The report addresses 7 recent cases. In 6 of the 7, Solomon determined that the employer's social-media policy was, at least in part, in violation of the NLRA. But in one case, he determined that the social-media policy complied with the NLRA!

Rejoice all of you employers who have worried so about avoiding the scrutiny of the NLRB over social-media policies! You now have a sample to follow! The report included the policy in its entirety. Now there can be no further reason to delay drafting that social-media policy, if ever one existed in the first place.

USERRA's Statute of Limitations

Posted by Molly DiBiancaOn May 30, 2012In: Uniformed Services (USERRA)

Email This Post | Print this Post

At our Annual Employment Law Seminar, U.S. Department of Labor Chief of Investigators Kenan Torrans gave an informative presentation on the requirements of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reinstatement Rights Act (USERRA). At the end of the presentation, I jumped in with my two cents and explained that I'd invited Kenan to speak because I think that USERRA compliance will be one of the biggest issues facing employers in the next several years.

One reason for my speculation is that USERRA differs from other employment-discrimination statutes in a number of ways. So employers who may not be familiar with USERRA's specific requirements and attempt to comply by applying rules that are generally applicable to Title VII or the ADA may find themselves to have run afoul of the law.

Another reason for my worries is the statute of limitations or, more specifically, the lack of one. An employee could, for example, return from military service and seek reemployment. Let's say the employer is unfamiliar with USERRA's requirements and denies the employee's request to return to work. The employee may find other work and the employer would think that all is well.

Well, not necessarily. If the employee's replacement job does not pay as well or has lesser benefits, the employee could later file a claim against the original employer. And, by "later," I mean much, much later. As in forever. Because there is no statute of limitations, there is no time limit on when an employee can file a claim.

Which is why a recent decision by the Sixth Circuit caught my attention. In Oswald v BAE Industries, Inc., No. 11-1119 (6th Cir. May 12, 2012), the plaintiff alleged that he'd been terminated due to his military service in Iraq. He filed suit three years after he was let go. The employer moved to dismiss on the grounds that the claim was precluded by the plaintiff's employment agreement, which required all employment-related claims be brought within six months. The court agreed and found that the employee's claims were time barred.

USERRA was amended in 2008 to preclude any statute-of-limitations defense and the employment agreement in this case was signed prior to the amendment. So this would not work in new contracts drafted today. However, it is important for employers who have such provisions in employment agreements already in place.

Calling All Employees! . . . As Long As They're Not Driving

Posted by Lauren Moak RussellOn May 29, 2012In: Policies

Email This Post | Print this Post

text alert.jpgDelaware employers should be aware of the risks of employees' use of cell phones while driving. It's a recipe for litigation. Delaware employers should have a clear policy prohibiting employees from using cell phones whild driving on company business. The use of hand-held devices while driving is illegal in Delaware and employers should avoid liability for employees' violations of state law. As a starting point, employers should prohibit employees from violating any traffic laws while operating a vehicle on company time.

A recent article in the Washington Post takes these concerns one step further, and discusses several incidents in which employees did serious bodily harm to innocent third-parties while they were driving and talking on cell phones. Pizza delivery companies have also learned this lesson the hard way--you no longer see 30-minute delivery guarantees because franchisors were sued when their employees took up dangerous driving practices to meet the deadlines. One plaintiff won a $21.6 million jury verdict in a case arising from a cell-phone related car accident. Significantly, that accident occurred in 2004, before many states prohibited use of hand-held phones for talking or texting while driving.

If you weren't convinced already , these stories should encourage you to communicate clearly with your employees that, regardless of how important their assignment, they may not violate traffic laws to complete it!